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Abstract
Foraging animals typically encounter opportunities that they either pursue or skip, but occasionally meet several
alternatives simultaneously. Behavioural ecologists predict preferences using absolute properties of each option, while
decision theorists focus on relative evaluations at the time of choice. We use European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) to
integrate ecological reasoning with decision models, linking and testing hypotheses for value acquisition and choice
mechanism. We hypothesise that options’ values depend jointly on absolute attributes, learning context, and subject’s state.
In simultaneous choices, preference could result either from comparing subjective values using deliberation time, or from
processing each alternative independently, without relative comparisons. The combination of the value acquisition
hypothesis and independent processing at choice time has been called the Sequential Choice Model. We test this model
with options equated in absolute properties to exclude the possibility of preference being built at the time of choice.
Starlings learned to obtain food by responding to four stimuli in two contexts. In context [AB], they encountered options A5
or B10 in random alternation; in context [CD], they met C10 or D20. Delay to food is denoted, in seconds, by the suffixes.
Observed latency to respond (Li) to each option alone (our measure of value) ranked thus: LA<LC,LB,,LD, consistently
with value being sensitive to both delay and learning context. We then introduced simultaneous presentations of A5 vs. C10
and B10 vs. C10, using latencies in no-choice tests to predict sign and strength of preference in pairings. Starlings preferred
A5 over C10 and C10 over B10. There was no detectable evaluation time, and preference magnitude was predictable from
latency differentials. This implies that value reflects learning rather than choice context, that preferences are not constructed
by relative judgements at the time of choice, and that mechanisms adapted for sequential decisions are effective to predict
choice behaviour.
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Introduction
We present a theoretical and experimental investigation of
animal choice that links foraging ecology, state- and context-
dependent learning and hypothetical cognitive mechanisms for
choice. Foraging animals search, detect, pursue, catch, and
consume prey of diverse kinds, each time experiencing the
consequences of the whole cycle of events. Throughout these
sequences they store information about prey physical attributes
(e.g., search time, size, taste, handling time) and about experienced
consequences of their decision to pursue such prey (e.g., hedonic
impact, improvements in energetic state or other psychological
correlates of survival and reproduction).
From a learning point of view, experienced consequences
constitute biologically programmed signals that retrospectively
give value to (reinforce) earlier links of each typical sequence (e.g.,
[1,2]) and hence affect future foraging decisions. In terms of
learning theory, stimuli identifying prey types are conditional
stimuli (CS) and the consequences of pursuing each prey type are
unconditional stimuli (US). If, in infrequent occasions, the CSs
corresponding to different outcomes occur simultaneously, for
instance if two prey types are simultaneously in the field of view,
the subject faces a choice. In such cases, preference between the
stimuli that identify prey types will depend on the history of
reinforcement, namely the returns with which each set of stimuli
has been correlated in the past (e.g., [3–5]). This can produce
apparently irrational preferences, because absolute properties of
prey types (i.e. context and state independent properties) are not
the only determinants of their subjective value. The point we are
making for learning can underlie observed irrationalities such as
the Concorde (in evolutionary biology) or Sunk Cost (in
economics) fallacies [6–8] and ‘within-trial contrast’ in experi-
mental psychology [9,10]. To elaborate this point, consider how
an unwarranted preference can be caused by learning history:
consuming two prey of equal body mass causes the same energy
gain and should be treated indifferently, but if typically one of
them has higher searching costs, the costly one would have been
experienced under greater need and would elicit a memory for
higher hedonic impact [11–18], leading to it being preferred. The
rationale can be extended to the effect of context. If two prey of
equal body mass are typically met in periods where they rank
differently respect to the background of alternative prey types,
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then they can be mnemonically associated with positive (elation) or
negative (frustration) contrasts, independently of energetic state.
Such contrast effects are well known behaviourally and neurobi-
ologically (e.g., [19–21]).
Optimal choice in simultaneous encounters should be free from
such effects, but simultaneous encounters may be too infrequent to
select for learning processes immune to these fallacious effects. The
structure of most species’ ecology means that state- and context-
dependent reinforcement, evolved as adaptations to serial cycles,
are likely to dominate learning-dependent valuation (e.g., [22–
24]). Thus, we conclude that the subjective valuation of each
option may be affected by factors other than their intrinsic
objective value because of learning processes but these valuations
must interact to control choices [25–29], and this we discuss next.
Learning, choice and decision making attract multidisciplinary
interest, and it is not surprising that theories follow differing
rationales and make different predictions. For instance, a
comprehensive recent review ([30]; see also [31,32]) includes
process-specific predictions in the definition of what a decision is,
starting thus: ‘A decision is a deliberative process that results in the
commitment to a categorical proposition. An apt analogy is a
judge or jury that must take time to weigh evidence for alternative
interpretations and/or possible ramifications before settling on a
verdict.’ (p. 536, our italics).
The view that decisions take time and deliberation time reflects
a tradeoff between speed of action and accuracy of decision is a
logical expectation, but it is still subject to empirical research. We
have argued that because sequential encounters are frequent and
simultaneous choices rare, the latter are handled by mechanisms
selected for their performance in the former, and this may mean
an absence of deliberation time. The mechanism we propose is
that in the (rare) simultaneous encounters, each option elicits its
own typical latency to act reflecting its encoded subjective value,
and a ‘‘choice’’ results from responding towards the option
eliciting the shorter latency [28].
Our overall view is that subjective valuation reflects state- and
context-dependent changes in wellbeing caused by each option in
no-choice encounters, and that when options are met simulta-
neously preferences reflect a horse-racing competition for expres-
sion of each option treated independently. To emulate a stylized
version of natural foraging, in our experiments the subjects learn
by facing different alternatives sequentially, and in infrequent
occasions face simultaneous choices between types. In particular,
we trained European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) in two contexts,
[AB] and [CD], thus generating context-dependent differential
utilities across foraging options [33,34]. In context [AB], they
sequentially encountered options A5 or B10 in random alternation;
in context [CD], they met C10 or D20 in a similar fashion. Suffixes
indicate delays to food, in seconds. The animals then faced
infrequent simultaneous choice trials between options that
belonged to different contexts, namely between A5 and C10 and
between B10 and C10 (Figure 1).
We make the following specific predictions: (i) in sequential
encounters stimuli whose outcome causes more favourable state
changes relative to their context will cause shorter latencies to
respond. Notice that options equal in absolute properties but
experienced in different contexts can then have different value; (ii)
preferences in simultaneous encounters should be predictable by
assuming cross-censorship between the latencies observed in
sequential encounters, and (iii) decisions should not take extra
time; responding to an option in a simultaneous choice should not
take longer than when the same option is encountered alone.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved and carried out in strict accordance
with the recommendations of the Ethical Review Committee of
the Department of Zoology of the University of Oxford. The
starlings that participated in this experiment were obtained and
kept under Natural England license No. 20083718 and were
reintroduced into a communal aviary after the experiment, before
being released back into the wild. All efforts were made to
minimize suffering.
Subjects
Eight wild-caught adult European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris)
participated in the experiment. All had laboratory experience
unrelated to the contingencies they encountered here. The birds
were kept outdoors before starting the experiment, when they were
transferred to individual indoor cages (160 cm645 cm640 cm)
that served as housing and testing chambers. Indoor temperatures
ranged from 15 to 18uC and lights followed a 12:12 dark schedule
with light from 0700 to 1900. Starlings were rewarded with 20 mg
BioServH precision pellets throughout the experimental sessions
and provided with three hours of free access to turkey crumbs
(14:30 to 17:30) and 10 mealworms daily. This regime allows the
starlings’ body weights to remain stable at approximately 90% of
their free-feeding weight [35].
Apparatus
Each cage had an operant panel attached to the centre of the
back wall. The panel had three sections: a middle subpanel, facing
the cage (10 cm wide), and two side subpanels (each 10 cm wide)
attached to the cage at a 110 degree angle from the centre
subpanel. Each panel had a response key in the centre (11 cm
from the bottom) that could be illuminated with a variety of hues
and black and white symbols. The middle subpanel also had a
food hopper (2 cm from the bottom) that was connected to a pellet
dispenser (Campden InstrumentsH). Trials were controlled by
custom software running on the MicrosoftH WindowsH operating
system and attached to an Animal Behavior Environment Test
System (Campden InstrumentsH) via WhiskerServer [36].
Figure 1. Experimental design schematics. Animals were trained
in two alternating contexts. In context [AB], they encountered options
A5s or B10s in random alternation; in context [CD], they met C10s or D20s
(Training). The animals were then tested by introducing, infrequent
simultaneous choice trials between options that belonged to different
contexts, namely between A5s and C10s and between B10s and C10s
(Testing). Delay to food in each option is denoted, in seconds, by the
suffixes; symbols exemplify the type of stimuli presented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g001
Context-Dependent Preferences in Starlings
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 May 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 5 | e64934
Procedure
Training. After brief preliminary training (detailed in Text
S1) the training phase began. All subjects were exposed to four
stimuli (options), implemented as coloured keys that, once pecked,
led to a food reward being delivered after a pre-established waiting
time, or delay. Two of the options were encountered in one
context and the other two in a different context. Contexts are
defined exclusively by the pair of options that could potentially be
encountered. In context [AB] there were random sequential
encounters with options A5 or B10 and in context [CD] with
options C10 or D20.
Starlings received one training session per day for 12 days. Each
session was divided into four 44-trial sub-sessions, each sub-session
involving one of the two contexts, yielding up to 176 trials per
day/bird (thus a maximum of 7.04 g of food could be received
during testing by each subject). The order of presentation of
contexts alternated across subjects and days. Half of the subjects
started the first session with context [AB] and the other half with
context [CD]. On each particular session, the subjects that began
with context [AB] ended with context [CD], and on the next day,
they began with context [CD] and ended with context [AB].
Contexts were separated by an interval of either 45 (first and third
transition) or 60 minutes (second transition). Sessions ended after
176 trials or 6.5 hours from the session start, whichever came first.
Within each context, birds experienced 40 single-option trials
(20 per option) and 4 peak trials (2 per option), all separated by a
30-s inter-trial-interval (ITI). Single-option trials emulated sequen-
tial encounters in natural settings and provided the birds
information about the properties of each option. These trials
began with the green centre key flashing (700 ms ON, 300 ms
OFF). A single peck to this key switched its light off and caused one
of the side keys to start flashing one of four possible symbols at the
same rate used for the centre key. A peck to this key turned it
steadily on and initiated the delay associated with the displayed
symbol (5, 10 or 20 s). The time between pecking the green centre
key and pecking the flashing side key is hereafter referred to as the
latency to respond. The first peck after the delay elapsed turned
the side key symbol off and produced two food pellets followed by
the ITI. Peak trials were identical to single-option trials except that
once the flashing side key was pecked, the symbol remained
continuously on for 60 s, and then extinguished without
reinforcement. These trials were used to determine the animals’
knowledge of the delay to reward associated with each particular
option [37,38]. The order and sides in which the options were
presented were pseudo-randomised with the constraint that no
two-peak trials could occur consecutively. Symbol/delay parings
were partially counterbalanced across birds. To equate the rate of
reward across contexts and thus minimize possible differences in
satiation states, we adjusted the usual 30 s ITI every fifth single-
option trial. We proceeded as follows: we summed the delays to
food from the preceding five single-option trials, subtracted this
value from its theoretical maximum of 100 s (5 delays of 20 s) and
then added this value to the 30 s ITI.
Testing. This phase was structurally similar to the training
phase except that choice trials were added. All such trials were
cross-context, involving choices either between A5 and C10 or
between B10 and C10. Half of the subjects were first tested with
choices between A5 and C10 and the remaining half with choices
between B10 and C10. When preference reached stability, choice
types were swapped: subjects that previously chose between A5
and C10 faced choices between B10 and C10, and vice-versa. Both
tests continued until the stability criteria were met: a standard
deviation less than 10 for choice percentages and no visible trend
in choice percentages, both during the last three sessions.
Sixteen simultaneous choice trials were presented daily. These
were presented in pairs and separated by the ITI. Each pair of
choice trials was presented at the beginning and the end of each
context substituting the first and last two single-option trials that
would normally occur during training. Choice trials were similar
to single-option trials with the exception that pecking the flashing
centre key caused two different symbols, one on each side key, to
begin flashing simultaneously. A single peck to one of these keys
turned the selected symbol continuously on, triggered the
appropriate delay, and extinguished the unselected option. Thus,
a bird committed itself to one of the options with its first peck to a
flashing symbol. Again, the time between pecking the centre key
and pecking one of the flashing side keys will be considered the as
latency to choose. Once an option was selected, the trial proceeded
as a regular single-option trial.
SCM simulations. Only latencies from single-option trials
collected at stability were used to run the simulations. To compute
predictions for preferences of A5 vs. C10 and of B10 vs. C10, we
used latencies from single-option trials in the same test sessions in
which choice proportions were measured. A separate Monte Carlo
simulation using a nonparametric estimate of the cumulative
distribution functions of the data yielded extremely similar
predictions and thus is not reported.
Each simulation involved 10,000 experiments of 96 trials each
[48 A5 vs. C10 and 48 B10 vs. C10 trials]. For any given trial, the
simulation drew one latency for each option [A5 and C10 or B10
and C10] from the population of observed latencies during single-
option trials and predicted the option to be chosen in the
simultaneous presentation as the one yielding the shortest latency.
Data analysis. Prior to analysis, all proportion and latency
data were successfully normalized using an arcsine square root and
a natural log transformation, respectively [39,40]. A Type-1 error
rate of 0.05 was adopted for all reported statistical comparisons.
Preliminary analyses (see Text S2 for details) revealed that the
context in which test trials occurred had no significant effect on
preference, thus we pooled data across testing contexts for all
further analyses. One bird was dropped early on from the
experiment due to showing a strong side preference.
Results
Preferences
When given a choice between two options with the same within-
context ranking but signalling different delays to reward [A5 vs.
C10], starlings chose C10, the option with lower immediacy, 19.8%
of the time (range: 2.1–47.9%). Conversely, when immediacy was
the same but within-context ranking differed [B10 vs. C10],
starlings preferred the option with higher ranking, C10, 69.7% of
the time (range: 54.2–85.1%). One-sample t tests of magnitude of
preference against indifference revealed that both these findings
deviated significantly from chance [t(6) = 23.828, p = .009 and
t(6) = 5.086, p = .002 for the A5 vs. C10 and B10 vs. C10 tests,
respectively]. Figure 2 shows both average and individual choice
proportions.
Perception and encoding of delay to reward
A candidate explanation for the preferences observed in the B10
vs. C10 tests lies in possible distortions of memory for waiting
times. If the representation of the temporal properties of each
option (i.e., their immediacy) is affected by its context, then the
starlings may in fact be choosing between options that, in spite of
being objectively equivalent, are remembered as signalling
subjectively different delays to reward. We used two techniques
to test this hypothesis: one based on pecking patterns and the other
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based on peak time (i.e., the time with maximum response rate).
Figure 3 shows the pecking pattern in peak trials, averaged across
subjects. For all options, the average maximum response rates
were near the programmed reward time while peak rates
decreased and spreads increased with longer delays. A repeated-
measures analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) with option and time as
fixed factors, subjects as random factor and pecking rate as
dependent variable confirmed a significant effect of option
[F(3,18) = 42.629, p,.001], time [F(59,354) = 121.546, p,.001]
and their interaction [F(177,1062) = 18.919, p,.001]. Of partic-
ular interest are the pecking patterns for options B10 and C10 as
they provide a test for the hypothesis that contextual effects on
preference were mediated by distortions of subjective temporal
estimates. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that pecking
rates did not differ systematically between options B10 and C10
(p = .289), but did differ for all other comparisons (largest p = .018),
thus suggesting that the effect of within-context ranking was not
mediated by distortions in interval timing. The analyses based on
the location of peaks returned similar findings (see Text S3 for
details).
Sequential-Choice Model
Simulations. According to the SCM, preferences in simul-
taneous choice trials should be predictable from the latencies
observed in sequential encounters. Predicting choice preferences
from performance in single-option (no-choice) trials is an exclusive
feature of the SCM, and for this reason it is of paramount
importance for this study. The simulations predicted average
preferences for C10 of 37.9% and 70.3% in A5 vs. C10 and B10 vs.
C10 tests, respectively. Figure 4 shows the observed preferences
(black bars) and the predictions of the simulations (white bars).
Qualitatively, the simulation predicted both kinds of choices
accurately. However, while the SCM predicted the results of the
B10 vs. C10 tests with high accuracy, it did not do so for the A5 vs.
C10 tests, where observed preferences were more extreme than
those predicted. Figure 5 shows the observed versus predicted
preferences for C10 for all subjects in both tests as well as an
unconstrained regression line for each test. The best case model
performance occurs when every data point falls in the main
diagonal (where predictions of the model and empirical observa-
tions match). For the B10 vs. C10 tests, the regression line falls close
to the theoretical optimum whereas for the A5 vs. C10 tests the
regression deviates considerably. One way to read the results of the
A5 vs. C10 tests in Figure 5 is that, based on the latencies of
sequential trials, the simulations never predict preferences for A5
stronger than 80%, but the data do show such cases. We will refer
to a potential explanation for this dissociation in the ability of the
SCM to quantitatively predict choice across tests in the discussion.
Latencies in sequential encounters. The SCM argues that
latencies to respond to opportunities encountered sequentially
reflect both the attributes of each option and those of the
background opportunities, and that such latencies should be good
predictors of the relative preferences of options when encountered
simultaneously. Here we test the first part of these arguments.
Figure 6 shows the average median latencies for each option
during single-option trials. A repeated-measures ANOVA con-
Figure 2. Proportion of choices for option C10 in both
preference tests. White and grey bars show preference for C10 in
the A5 vs. C10 and B10 vs. C10 tests, respectively. The rightmost columns
show average data. The horizontal dashed line indicates chance level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g002
Figure 3. Mean pecks per second in peak trials for options A5,
B10, C10 and D20. The vertical dashed lines indicate the time at which
reward was due in rewarded trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g003
Figure 4. Observed and predicted proportion of choices for
option C10 in both preference tests. Black bars represent the
observed average preference for C10 in the A5 vs. C10 (left) and B10 vs.
C10 (right) preference tests. White bars represent the preference for C10
predicted by the Monte Carlo simulations in the same tests. Error bars
represent one SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g004
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ducted on these data confirmed a significant effect of immediacy
[Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F(1.236, 7.417) = 20.042, p = .002].
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that latencies differed
significantly between options (largest p = .019) except for the
comparison between options A5 and C10 (p = .081). Further, these
latencies reflected both the immediacy and ranking of each option
in its own context: greater immediacy and better ranking both
shortened latency to accept an option. In particular, the within-
context ranking effect is demonstrated because latencies to accept
option C10 were significantly shorter than latencies to accept
option B10 despite both options signalling the same delay to
reward. In contrast, despite A5 and C10 signalling different delays
in this case the difference between median latencies was short of
conventional significance. These findings show that ranking did
participate in the valuation of the options. The absence of a
conventionally significant difference between A5 and C10, does not
imply that absolute attributes do not have any effect, because these
latencies were sufficiently short to approach psychophysical
reaction times (cf. [41]) rather than strategically variable delays
to accept individual options. If a subject’s response is close to its
reaction time, ‘‘floor effects’’ are likely to mask any possible
difference in subjective value.
Since there is a danger that an analysis based on medians may
miss a potential effect of differences in the tails of the distributions,
we also performed an analysis based on the whole frequency
distributions of latencies (see Text S4 and Figure S1). This analysis
showed the same trends. In sum, the latencies collected during
single-option trials confirm the SCM’s proposal that such latencies
should be sensitive both to the option’s objective properties (i.e. its
immediacy) and to the properties of the background alternatives
available in the environment (i.e. its ranking).
Latencies in simultaneous choices. The comparison
between latencies in single-option and choice trials pitches models
based on deliberative comparison at the time of choice and on
independent processing of options against each other: executing a
cognitive comparison should make simultaneous-choice latencies
longer than single-option latencies, while cross-censorship in the
horse-racing SCM model should lead to choices taking less time
than single option responses. The magnitude of the expected
shortening depends on the similarity between the distributions of
latencies collected during single-option trials, and shortening
should be greater for the option that is less preferred (i.e., more
censored) in choice trials.
Figure 7 shows the average median latencies for each option
when chosen in simultaneous choice trials and when encountered
alone in single-option trials. Paired-samples t-tests failed to reveal
significant difference in latencies depending on whether an option
was encountered by itself or chosen in a simultaneous choice
situation [all ts(6) $21.577 and #1.326, smallest p = .166].
This central tendency analysis was complemented by analyses of
the complete frequency distributions of latencies (see Figure S2 for
details). We summarized each individual latency distribution by
Figure 5. Overall fit of the SCM. Scatter plot of the preference for
C10 predicted by the SCM versus the observed preference for C10. Each
dot represents one subject, with black and white dots referring to the
A5 vs. C10 and B10 vs. C10 tests. Both lines are linear regressions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g005
Figure 6. Latencies to accept each option in single-option
trials. Median latencies to accept options A5, B10, C10 and D20 in single-
option trials, averaged across subjects (+SE).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g006
Figure 7. Latencies to accept each option in single-option and
simultaneous choice trials. Latencies are separated according to
collection time: either at stability in the A5 vs. C10 preference tests or at
stability in the B10 vs. C10 preference tests. Grey and white bars present
median latencies averaged across subjects (+SE) from single-option and
simultaneous choice trials, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064934.g007
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means of a cumulative frequency score of latencies both in forced
and simultaneous choice trials using the approach described in
Text S4. We also calculated such scores for choice latencies in the
SCM Monte Carlo simulations. The latter predicted a significant
shortening only for option B10 [t(6) = 2.571, p = .042], but the
observed shortening for this option, while having the expected
trend, did not reach conventional statistical significance in a two-
tail test [t(6) = 2.155, p = .075], even though it was the strongest
shortening we observed (see panel B, Figure S2). We are aware
that given the strength of the a priori directional prediction towards
a shortening a one-tail test might have been considered more
appropriate, but we chose to take the same conservative approach
that we used throughout and treat this result as suggestive but not
robustly demonstrated. All other predicted and observed shorten-
ings were non-significant. No lengthening of latencies (which
would support a deliberative comparison model) was either
predicted by the Monte Carlo simulations or observed for any
option.
Discussion
Our main objectives were to integrate ecological reasoning,
knowledge about learning, and concepts of decision processes to
advance towards a comprehensive model of foraging choices. We
tested predictions about learning effects (basically that subjective
value as acquired in no-choice encounters depends on state and
context-dependent effects of each option’s outcome) and whether
the translation of these subjective values into preferences in
simultaneous encounters involved a relative comparison at the
time of choice or resulted from the expression of the same
mechanisms used in no-choice encounters. We found support for
our learning hypotheses because when facing simultaneous choices
between options differing in either delay to reward or in within-
context ranking, starlings’ choices were better explained by
remembered context-dependent utility than by remembered
objective properties. Analysis of temporal responding showed that
preferences were not driven by distorted memory for temporal
properties of the options.
Consistently with the assumptions of the SCM, latencies to
accept options presented singly were affected both by the options’
objective properties and their within-context ranking: the higher
the immediacy and the better the ranking the shorter the
corresponding latencies. This supports the view that latencies
expressed in sequential encounters reflect the operation of a
valuation process and justifies their use in predicting simultaneous
choice [25–29].
One of the unique predictions of the SCM is that we ought to be
able to predict preferences in simultaneous choices from latencies
observed during sequential encounters. The present experiment
tested this prediction in a situation where valuation was context-
dependent and thus significantly influenced by background
alternatives. The model was qualitatively accurate in both choice
tests and remarkably accurate quantitatively in one of them.
Specifically, the model predicted preferences in simultaneous
choices were almost identical to those observed when the options
have the same immediacy and different rankings [B10 vs. C10] but
were directionally correct but less extreme than observed when
options had the same ranking and different immediacies [A5 vs.
C10]. This pattern of findings relates to our latency findings: both
the analysis based on median latencies and that based on
cumulative frequency distributions indicated that the latencies
recorded for A5 in single-option trials were somewhat shorter (but
not reliably so) than those found for C10. Thus, the results from the
Monte Carlo simulations (that used latencies from the same
distributions) did not reach the strength of preference for A5 that
was observed, despite predicting preference in the correct
direction. Conversely, we did find significant differences between
the distribution of latencies for B10 and C10, which in turn yielded
predictions that virtually matched the observed preferences.
What could have caused this differential success? The SCM’s
assumption is that differences in subjective value of an option
relative to its background alternatives are detectable in the
readiness to respond to it, expressed as a distribution of latencies to
accept single options. The model does not claim that latencies
cause choices but instead that latencies and choices are expressions
of a common process acting both in sequential and simultaneous
choice [28]. Tests of the SCM use latencies as ‘windows’ to the
processes involved in the subjective valuation of each option.
When there are clear differences in latency distributions such as
observed between options B10 and C10 (cf. Figure S1) the model
predicts preference very accurately. When latency distributions
mostly overlap, such as for options A5 and C10 (cf. Figure S1), the
model is unable to generate extreme preferences such as those
obtained in the A5 vs. C10 preference tests.
Clearly, given that in the case of A5 vs. C10 preferences were
very strong but latencies did not differ much, comparable latency
distributions are not diagnostic of equivalent subjective value. We
believe that this may have been an expression of a floor effect. The
average median latencies for options A5 and C10 during sequential
encounters were .565 and .654 sec, respectively, even though they
had a 2:1 ratio in terms of immediacy. These extremely short
response latencies together with the starlings’ sensitivity to their
immediacy [viz., they strongly preferred A5 in the A5 vs. C10
preference tests] suggest that latencies to accept these options were
levelled by reaction times. The high subjective value of both
options led to latencies so short as to reach the limits of reaction
time in the present apparatus. The fact that the birds can generate
strong choice preferences in the absence of differences in latencies
argues for the existence of routes to drive choice other than those
embodied in the SCM, but it would appear that these additional
routes only kick in when latencies are very short and their
distributions superimpose.
We also pointed out that while the conventional deliberative
models of choice predict a lengthening of latencies in choices
versus no-choice encounters, the SCM predicts the opposite
[25,28]. Our simulations of the SCM choice mechanism indicated
that a shortening should be observed when comparing latency to
B10 in single-option trials and when in the B10 vs. C10
simultaneous-choice trials. As previously stated, the shortening
should be particularly noticeable for the poorer options, as indeed
it was. Conversely, options A5 and C10 elicited short, virtually
undistinguishable latencies during single-option trials, making any
change in latency between sequential and choice trials very
difficult to detect.
The experimental results yielded a shortening, albeit not
conventionally significant in a two-tailed test (p = 0.075). In no
case was there any indication for an increase in latencies consistent
with a deliberation process at the time of choice. Taken together
these results favour the SCM cross-censorship mechanism rather
than of a deliberative process at the time of choice, particularly
because the task both families of models face is asymmetric:
latencies have floor but not ceiling and thus lengthening should be
easier to observe than shortening.
In short, then, the confluence of ecological and mechanistic
hypotheses that we endorse argues that because in natural
circumstances animals typically meet feeding opportunities
sequentially and seldom simultaneously, their learning and
decision processes do not include cognitive mechanisms evolved
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due to their performance in simultaneous choice, and our
observations endorse this view. In sequential encounters animals
assign subjective value to prey types according to their state and
the contrast with the background, and in simultaneous encounters,
when by necessity state and background are unique, the learning
past still controls choice. Preference thus is not built at the time of
choice, by a cognitive deliberation that evaluates options’
differences, but by the shadow of past state-dependent valuation
learning.
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Figure S1 Average cumulative frequency distribution of
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